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evelopments in animal biotechnology are debated in a lively 
manner, not only in the Netherlands, but in many other 
countries as well. This technology mobilizes strong forces in 
society. On the one hand it is said that it holds a promise for the 
production of vital life-saving preparations and huge economic benefits, 
on the other hand it seems to reduce animals - our fellow creatures, 
closely related to us - to production machines. People have the strong 
conviction that the development of animal biotechnology is morally 
problematic and that to secure some basic values public policy is 
necessary.1 
 
What are the anxieties and which basic values are at stake? That is the 
question we want to answer in this article. In doing so we shall refer to 
public debate in the Netherlands, which concentrates on transgenic 
(farm) animals, because it is our strong conviction that (at least some of) 
the issues which are being discussed in our country will arise in any 




Why is animal biotechnology on the agenda? In Dutch society, but not 
only there, public concern about biotechnology can be specified in the 
following way).2 The public is not very well informed about what is 
                                                          
1  cf. Europbarometre 39/1, Europeans, Science and Technology, Public Understanding and 
Attitudes by INRA (Europe) and Report International, Commission of the European 
Communities: EUR 15461 (European Union, Brussels, 1993).  
2 Report of the Advisory Committee on Ethics and Biotechnology in Animals. (Title: Ethics and 





going on. There is a gap between science and technology on one side 
and the public on the other. To many people biotechnology seems to be 
very opaque. It is developed in laboratories - behind 'closed' doors - by 
specialists. They are like 'magicians' who are 'playing God' by 
manipulating life in an incomprehensible way. 
 
What are the consequences of biotechnology? This is an important 
concern, which may be interpreted in, at least, two directions: there is a 
fear of risks, perhaps in the long run (cf. for instance Softenon kids, DES 
daughters!) and on the other side there is a fear concerning the slippery 
slope, especially in view of the application of genetic technology to 
human beings, since (higher) animals - biologically closely related to us - 
are the object of  biotechnological changes. 
 
This so-called 'makeability' of new forms of life is another source for 
anxiety. Influenced perhaps by the media, the Animal Protection 
Movement, and by science fiction, the public realize that science and 
science fiction lie closely together. Call it the 'Boys of Brasil' or 'Jurassic 
Park' effect.  
 
Moreover, the use of animals in itself causes questions. There is an 
increasing concern regarding the exploitation of animals in scientific 
research and bio-industry. People see genetic modification as another 
step in the direction of the reduction of animals to instruments of 
production. Animals are used as mere things.3 
  
Concern about the social-economic consequences may be mentioned 
separately. Farmers for instance are afraid of becoming (more) depen-
dant on pharmaceutical industries, particularly because of the 
probability of patenting biotechnological inventions in the field of 
agriculture and stock breeding. Moreover, what are the consequences 
for the developing countries? Some people fear that biotechnology will 
not feed the world but that patenting will make third world countries 
more dependant on western industries.  
 
Last but not least, there is a credibility problem, an atmosphere of 
distrust towards science and technology. Scientific developments are 
driven by economic forces. According to many people the real goal of 
science and technology is economic gain, although they claim to pursue 
the 'common good'. Moreover science and technology seem to develop 
autonomously. How is it possible to influence or direct these far 
                                                          
3 M.B.H. Visser and F. J. Grommers, eds., Dier of Ding. Objectivering van dieren (Animal 
or Thing. Animals as Objects) (Pudoc, Wageningen, 1988).  
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reaching developments in a democratic society? How can we  prevent 
the technocrats from manipulating public opinion? And when 
democratic control is possible, the question of the direction of the 
development becomes relevant. It forces us to ask whether technological 
development is a good thing in itself. If we say ‘It serves progress’, then 
it is necessary to know what progress is.4 
 
That these anxieties were all present in Dutch society was confirmed by 
public debate, in May 1993, on genetic modification of animals.5  Much 
attention was paid to the slippery slope between animal biotechnology 
and application to genetic modification of human beings. The majority 





Growing awareness of the moral status of animals  
 
One of the key points of public concern is the moral 'status' of animals. 
What is their position in morality? In order to clarify public debate on 
animal biotechnology it may be helpful to make some historical remarks 
on the position of animals in society.6 In Dutch society, there has been 
an increasing consciousness of the fact that animals are to be considered 
as objects of moral concern. One might distinguish here four steps. 
 
In the first step cruelty to animals is seen as morally wrong. It is 
interesting to note, however, that, although it is recognized that animals 
can suffer, traditional arguments against cruelty are that it degenerates a 
person's moral quality7 or that it  causes public offence (e.g. Dutch Penal 
Code of 1886). 
 
                                                          
4 F. van Vugt and F. Brom, ‘Animal Biotechnology and Society: What are the issues?’ in 
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Animal Biotechnology, ed. M. McGloughlin 
(The Biotechnology Program, University of California, Davis, 1994), p.2: ‘But then what 
is progress? Is there a clear and unambiguous picture of where to go to bring us to a 
better situation? A Dutch comedian once defined progress as the situation in which all 
eskimos live in a centrally heated house and have to do their best to save money to buy 
a refrigerator. 
5 A.M. Hamstra and M.H. Feenstra, Publiek Debat: Genetische modificante van dieren, mag 
dat? Projectverslag en evaluatie (Public Debate: Genetic modification of animals, is that 
allowed? Project report and evaluation), (SWOKA, The Hague, 1994).  
6 F.W.A. Brom and E. Scroten, ‘Ethical questions around animal biotechnology. The 
Dutch approach.’, Livestock Production Science, 36, (1993), p.100f.  
7 I.Kant, ‘Grounding for the Metaphysics’ in Ethical Philosophy, I Kant (Hackett 




In the second step experiments with animals are considered as a moral 
problem. Therefore they have to be justified. The proportionality 
argument enters into the discussion: End and means should be balanced 
against each other. Regulations concerning experiments with animals 
are not based on the degeneration of a person's moral quality but on the 
insight that animals themselves deserve protection.8 
 
Thirdly, bioindustry and intensive cattle breeding become a moral 
problem. People realize that animal welfare is being threatened in 
factory farms. Farm animals run the risk of being reduced to mere 
production machines. There is an increasing awareness that animals 
have a moral status of their own, which is not to be reduced to a mere 
instrumental value for human ends.9 
 
The most recent step is induced by developments in animal 
biotechnology. In the Netherlands the genetically modified bull Herman 
may be considered as a catalyst for this phase of the debate, which is 
still going on. Several points are discussed. We confine ourselves to two 
points: 
 
1 Is the possibility to change the genetic make up of animals just 
another step in the process of domestication? Some call the new 
possibilities a sharp break10 and state that we need a new framework 
to discuss it. Others say it is business as usual and that therefore there 
is no problem at all. And finally there are people who seem to agree 
that animal biotechnology is in a sense business as usual but that this 
shows that domestication in itself is problematic.11 Behind these 
discussions there is a fundamental layer: philosophical and religious 
considerations in terms of Creation or evolution. Genetic 
modification is often seen as a violation of Creation or of 'the order of 
                                                          
8 A.N. Rowan and F.M. Loew, The animal research controversy, protest, process and public 
policy (Center for Animals and Public Policy, Tufts University School of Veterinary 
Medicine, Tuft, 1995).  
9 R. Harrison, Animal machines: the new factory farming industry  (Methuen, London, 
1964); P.R. Weipkema, Gedrag, welzijn en duurzaamheld (Behaviour, Welfare and 
Sustainability) (Agricultural University, Wageningen, 1993).  
10 ‘Report of the Advisory Committee on Ethics and Biotechnology in Animals’, p.12. 
11 For instance H. Verhoog, ‘Ethics and genetic engineering of animals’, in Morality, 
Worldview and Law; The Idea of a Universal Morality and its Critics, ed. A.A. Musschenga, 
G.Voorzanger and A. Soeterman (Van Gorcum, Assen, 1992), p.275: ‘The decision to 
interfere in the life of wild animals and to cage or domesticate them, becomes the first 
and very basic encroachment upon the intrinsic value of animals’. 
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Nature'. It is interesting to note that in the context of biotechnology 
the term 'playing God' pops up again and again.12 
 
2 Is animal biotechnology hazardous for the well-being of the animals 
involved? Since the experiments in Beltsville, Maryland in 1985 it is 
clear that genetic modification can cause great harm. In this 
experiment an attempt was made to change the meat-fat ratio by 
introducing foreign growth-promoting genes into pigs’ genome. This 
experiment caused (unintended) consequences. The transgenic pigs 
made in this experiment were very ill. They had ‘a high incidence of 
gastric ulcers, arthritis, cardiomegaly, dermatitis, and renal disease.’13 
This brings us to a central point in the discussion on animal 
biotechnology: do we know what we are doing?  
 
One of the consequences of this process of increasing moral concern in 
Dutch society has been the acknowledgment, by the government, of the 
'intrinsic value' of animals as a basis for official policy-making, from 
1981 onwards.14 Recognizing the 'intrinsic value' of animals means that 
they are brought into the realm of morality. (We'll come back to this 
later on.) 
 
In this context, the role of the Animal Protection Movement should be 
mentioned. It has been (and still is) very important for public discussi-
on. Its position in Dutch society is less polarized than in other countries. 




Animals as proper objects of moral concern 
 
How should we assess this development from a moral point of view? 
For we have to be careful not to make the mistake of a historical or 
sociological fallacy: developments in society as such are not morally 
normative. Feelings are facts and therefore they have to be taken 
seriously. But they are morally ambiguous. At best, they are markers of 
moral values not of moral decisions. The public concerns state different 
problems for ethical theory, like the status of nature, the fear for a 
slippery slope and so on. 
                                                          
12 E. Scroten, ‘Playing God. Some Theological Comments on a Metaphor’ in Christian 
Faith and Philosophical  Theology. Essays in Honour of Vincent Brummer, eds. G. Van den 
Brink et al (Kok/Pharos, Kampen, 1992). 
13 V.G. Pursel et al., ‘Genetic Engineering of Livestock’, Science, 244, (1989), p.1281.  
14 cf. Rijksoverheid en Dierenbescherming (National Government and Animal Protection), 





We want to focus on one of problems involved; the so-called 'intrinsic 
value' of animals. It is used quite often in discussions on animal 
biotechnology, but it is not always clear what is meant by it. 'Intrinsic 
value' may have three different meanings.15 
 
In a traditional moral context it means that a value is to be pursued for 
its own sake, whereas other values are instrumental. Take 'happiness' 
for example. We all hope and strive to be happy. In view of the 
(intrinsic) value of happiness values like money, love or knowledge are 
instrumental, in the sense that they may be instruments for becoming 
happy. By this example it may be clear that, in the traditional moral 
context, there are not many intrinsic values. Most values are, in some 
way or the other, instrumental. 
 
In discussions on animal biotechnology, however, the term 'intrinsic 
value' is not being used in its traditional sense. It is not likely that we see 
animals as values to be pursued for their own sake. The meaning of the 
expression is, rather, that animals have an inherent worthiness, a wor-
thiness of their own.16 They are not things, mere instruments or 
machines, but they are sentient beings, fellow creatures. In the context of 
biotechnology, then, the term 'intrinsic value' of animals is a way to 
express the point that animals, as sentient beings, are having, so to say, a 
'plus' apart from their instrumental value. The acknowledgment of this 
'plus' has become a cornerstone in Dutch legislation and official policy. 
 
This meaning of the term 'intrinsic value' of animals has an important 
implication: Animals become morally relevant. They are proper objects 
of our moral concern. In other words, we are not allowed to do with 
them just whatever we like. In some way or the other we should show a 
certain respect as to their worthiness. As it is said in an official report17 : 
 
Especially the criticism of the use of animals as experimental animals 
and of  livestock housing has resulted in the recognition that animals 
have a value of their own, or an intrinsic value, besides their instru-
mental  value to man. In other words, man has to respect the intrinsic 
value of animals. Animals come to fall under the province of ethics, not 
in the sense that animals are thought to act morally, but in the sense that 
they are deserving our moral care. 
                                                          
15 F.W.A. Brom, Dierlijke Biotechnologie als moreel probleem (Animal biotechnology as a 
moral problem) Thesis Utrecht University (Van Gorcum, Assen, 1997).  
16 Verhoog, ‘Ethics and genetic engineering of animals’, p.270.  
17 ‘Report of the Advisory Committee on Ethics and Biotechnology in Animals’, p.8. 
 




We conclude that 'intrinsic value', as a term to characterize the moral 
status of animals, might be seen as the basic concept of an ethical theory 
and practice as to the human-animal relationship. In this sense it may be 
compared with a term like 'human dignity', another basic concept in 
ethical theory and practice. 
   
Meanwhile, we have to admit that the content of the concept of 'intrinsic 
value' is rather vague. Does it mean that the Kantian principle 'never be 
treated solely as a means but always also as an end' should apply on 
animals? We don't think so. In the case of animals it means that animals 
have a 'plus', apart from their instrumental value for us, that they are 
proper objects of our moral concern. However it is not clear how this 
value should be operationalized in view of our behaviour and, more  
generally, the implications for public policy. But we think that the 
recognition that  animals deserve our moral concern is a necessary step 
before we can decide what  our moral concern in a concrete situation 
ought to be. In order to deal with concrete situations much work has to 
be done in shaping a clear conceptual framework and in specifying 
moral rules. It is foreseeable that in answering these questions 




Public policy and law in the Netherlands 
   
One of the problems is that we live in a multiform society, in which 
there are a variety of answers to ethical questions. So we are facing a 
problem here. From the point of view of public morality we find 
ourselves in a situation of uncertainty. This uncertainty has, at least, two 
aspects, namely a moral and a political aspect. That is to say, the fact 
that we face an uncertainty in moralibus  means that we are facing 
difficulties in policy making as well. As a matter of fact, policy makers 
have to cope with a problem that has four dimensions: (1) Public 
feelings, (2) moral problems, (3) philosophical and religious convictions, 
and (4) consequences for (public) policy. So, the problem we are facing 
is: How to deal with this uncertainty in (public) morality?  
 
In this situation of uncertainty, in the Netherlands, a 'no unless policy' is 
being developed concerning animal biotechnology. Genetic 





1 All genetic modification is controlled from a safety point of view: 
transgenic animals fall under GMO-regulations (GMO = Genetically 
Modified Organisms). 
 
2 Animal experimentation is only allowed in licensed institutions. 
These institutions need a company-based committee that advises the 
company on acceptability of the experiments. Experiments are 
allowed if the human interests at stake are of greater value than 
animal discomfort caused by the experiment. Transgenic animals fall 
under this law if their making is an animal experiment, or if they are 
used in an animal experiment.  
 
3 In 1992 the Animal Health and Welfare Act (AHWA) passed 
parliament after ten years of political discussion. It takes the form of a 
general law which (partly) has a 'no unless' structure: Acts which are 
dangerous to animal welfare are forbidden unless  permitted by 
special regulation. Under the AHWA genetic modification of animals, 
cloning and the making of chimaeras is not permitted unless assent is 
given by the Minister of Agriculture, Nature Management and 
Fisheries. This permission will only be given after assessment of the 
moral acceptability of the project by an independent advisory 
committee of experts. 
 
This means that any research project in the field of genetic modification 
of animals has to be assessed not only concerning the scientific quality 
and the risk aspects but concerning the ethical aspects as well. Biotech-
nological activities with animals are prohibited by the government 
unless it is not reasonable to think that relevant values are violated, or 
unless the aim is so important that the violation of these values may be 
overruled. In other words, there must be good reasons for carrying 
them out. This procedure is not meant to hamper the development of 
animal biotechnology, but it has to function as a tool against public fear. 
 
To add to this 'no unless policy' we would suggest a distinction between 
two interpretations: (1) in principle and (2) in practice. From a moral 
point of view one can react to animal biotechnology with a conditional 
'yes'. In other words, in principle it can be permitted to interfere in the 
genetic make-up of animals.  From the perspective of public policy, 
however, we would suggest to react to animal biotechnology with a 'no 
unless'; not as a sign of hostility or conservatism but as a sign of care 
and caution in a situation of uncertainty as it has been indicated above. 
In short: a policy of prudence. 
 
 







This assessment procedure involves the use of an 'evaluation 
framework'. The question 'What are good reasons?' has to be answered 
in the light of this evaluation framework. In this framework some 
principles play a role, reflecting the idea that animals enter into our 
moral horizon. These principles are partly a 'translation' into the animal 
realm of the four basic principles of bioethics18 (autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence and justice): 
 
Respect for the 'integrity' of animals 
This principle states that we should respect the 'wholeness' of the 
individual animal and its species-specific behaviour. Biotechnology 




This principle states that we should try to refrain from harming animals. 
And if we cause harm towards animals we should strive to minimalise 
it. Under this principle we can think of the ‘Three R's’ of animal 
experimentation (Replace animal use where possible, Reduce animal use 
where possible, and Refine animal research techniques so as to reduce 
animal pain and distress as much as possible).20 
 
Beneficence  
This principle states that we should care for animal health and welfare. 
Research projects in animal biotechnology should not only strive to 




If we do harm an animal, the end should justify the means. ‘Even 
moderate levels of unrelieved suffering must be ethically countered by 
an arguable important scientific goal and a well-designed protocol. The 
more acute the suffering, the more important the goal and tighter the 
                                                          
18 cf. T.L. Beauchamp and J.D. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, second edition 
(Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford, 1983).  
19 F.R. Heeger, ‘Respect for Animal Integrity?’ in Science, Ethics, Sustainability: The 
Responsibility of Science in Attaining Sustainable Development (Studies in Bioethics and 
Research Ethics 2) (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala, 1997), pp.243-252. 
20 W.M.S. Russel and R.L. Burch, The Principles of Humane Experimental Techniques, 




design, until we reach moral repugnance and the possible “beyond the 
pale” experiment.’21  
 
In addition to these four principles two other principles have been 
formulated: 
 
Possibility of redress  
The redress-principle is a type of precautionary principle. It has been 
derived from the work of the German ethicist Rendtorff.22  The core 
content for the field of animal biotechnology is, that in using this 
technology one has to act in such a way that one can be corrected by the 
consequences of one’s actions. This first aspect of the principle is  the 
question of safety-measures. In order to be able to be redressed by the 
consequences of particular action, these consequences need to be 
assessed. It is, however impossible to assess all consequences of an 
action. Some unforseen consequences might become irreversible. This 
means that it is not possible to introduce a new technology without 
taking a risk. The principle of redress implies that in advance, in 
planning the application of a biotechnology (in an animal) the risk has 
to be assessed and safety-measures have to be taken. 
  
The principle of redress, however, goes further. Even if we take in 
advance safety-measures, we still take risks. Despite our safety-
measures, things might go wrong. This is the way, the redress-principle 
goes beyond the question of safety. Safety-measures alone are not 
enough to justify the risks of the introduction of new technologies. 
According to the principle of redress another question has to be 
answered. 'Have we done enough to imagine the possible 
consequences?' By answering this question, we take responsibility, not 
only for what we know, but also for what we should know.23 In this 
way we take responsibility for the possible consequences of actions we 




                                                          
21 S. Donnelley and K. Nolan eds., ‘Animals, Science and Ethics’, Hastings Center Report, 
Special Supplement: The Ethics of Animal Experimentation and Research. May/June 
(1990), p.12.   
22 T. Rendtorff, Ethik. Grundelementen, Methodologie und Konkretionen einer ethischen 
Theologie; Zweite Auflage (Ethics, Elements, Methodology and Applications; Second Edition) 
(Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1990), p.133.  
23 In this way the principle of redress has a connection with Hans Jonas’ principle of 
responsibility (H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Ver antworung. Versug einer Ethik fur die 
technologisch Zivilisation (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1979/1989). 
 





The principle of redress shows, that we can not introduce a new 
technology without taking some risks. Therefore we need also a 
principle of controllability. In an open and democratic society actions 
that touch upon important common values (such as safety) need to be 
discussed in the open. Public access towards information and effective 
democratic control are important corner-stones of modern democracies. 
Animal biotechnology, because of its opaqueness is in need of structures 
that can help in creating this oneness. 
 
The burden of proof, then, is on the side of the one who wants to be 
involved in biotechnological activities. This has an important ethical 
impact: it challenges scientists and policy makers to make explicit their 
own moral judgments. In other words, they are challenged to reflect on 
what they are doing from a moral point of view. As mentioned above, 
we do not think that this procedure is meant to hamper the 
development of animal biotechnology. It is a tool to implement the 
principles previously stated. 
  
The research institute has to do its own ethical evaluation. In this way 
ethics is not an 'extra' that comes from the outside but it may become 
integrated within normal decision-making structures. The committee of 
experts looks at the evaluation and their advice will be based on the 
assessment of it. The advisory-report with both the evaluation of the 
researchers and the assessment of the committee will be public.24 
Individuals and pressure groups will get the opportunity to give their 
opinion before the minister decides whether or not an assent is given. In 
this way the controllability principle is applied. 
  
The idea behind this policy is that, if we follow it, then it may become 
more and more clear what it means to acknowledge the moral status of 
animals and how that may be operationalized. In other words, a case by 
case approach is chosen, hoping that it may have a heuristic function. 
This heuristic function is necessary because of the vagueness of the 






                                                          
24 It is of course allowed to keep scientific and technical information secret for 






* The recognition that animals deserve our moral concern is a corner-
stone for public policy and for political and ethical discussions. The 
recognition that animals deserve our moral concern is a necessary 
step before we can decide what our moral concern in a concrete 
situation ought to be. 
 
* Any discussion on the ethical aspects of animal biotechnology should 
aim at operationalisation in at least three directions:  Public policy, 
business policy, and professional behaviour. In this discussion 
various aspects should be taken into account: Scientific, economic, 
environmental, social, ethical, political. And no aspect can have an a 
priori or absolute precedence over the others.25 
 
* Biotechnologists and policy makers should not be neglecting cultural 
changes such as the ecological perspective and the increasing 
awareness that animals are within our moral horizon. Neither should 
they make the mistake to underestimate the importance of emotional 
strands in public opinion. We would like to underline, here, that 
animal biotechnology will only have a future if society wants to 
accept it. 
* The Dutch 'no unless policy' implies a project-wise evaluation which 
has an important ethical impact. It challenges scientists and policy-
makers to make their moral judgements explicit. Moreover, this 
policy aims to create an open forum for public discussion. Such a 
policy is taking public concern and moral reflection seriously. In that 
way citizens are taken seriously, a necessity for any open and 
democratic society. 
  
* It is important to create an ethical assessment procedure that can 
have a heuristic function. The vagueness of the values at stake asks 
for clarification and (new) moral insights. 
 
 
A slightly different version of this article appears in Italian: F.W.A. 
Brom en E. Schroten, ‘L’etica e la biotechnoligia animal. Un’analisi sullo 
sfonde della politica pubblica nei Paessi Bassi’. In P. Bisogno, ed. 
Prometheus, Rivista internazionale di politica della scienza: Bioetica: le ragioni 
della vita e della scienza, 22 (Franco Angeli, Milano, 1996).  
                                                          
25 S. Donnelley, ‘Philosophic and Ethical Challenges of Animal Biotechnology’, Hastings 
Center Report, 24/1, (1994), Special Supplement: The Brave New World of Animal 
Biotechnology, S. 20.  
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